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ABSTRACT 
Proposing any major new federal initiative regarding water in the 
western United States might seem preposterous, given conventional 
wisdom and entrenched positions on state control of water resources. 
But there is a strong rationale, and a growing imperative, for a new 
federal water policy for the West. Many river basins face serious 
problems as limited water supplies are over-allocated, demands 
continue to increase, and climate change promises to exacerbate the 
West’s perennial problems of scarcity and variability. Solutions to 
such problems are likely to be expensive and will need to address 
national interests as well as state and local concerns. Like the first two 
eras of federal water policy—water project development, followed by 
environmental protection—the third wave will need to bring federal 
money to the table in proportion to the size of the problems to be 
solved. But that money will come with important conditions, helping 
to ensure that western water problems are resolved in a way that 
meets national needs. This Article begins by summarizing the value 
of the federal role in western water management, examining the first 
two waves of federal water policy, and exploring how Congress 
employed a broadly similar approach to both building water supply 
projects and regulating water quality. It then turns to indications of 
modern demands for federal involvement in western water issues, and 
concludes with observations about important elements of a third wave 
of federal water policy for the West. 
INTRODUCTION 
hen the 113th Congress passed the Water Resources Reform 
and Development Act (WRRDA) of 2014,1 it was remarkable 
in more ways than one. A Congress that generally dislikes federal 
involvement in matters of natural resources had directed the Army 
Corps of Engineers (the Corps) to undertake numerous water-related 
activities,2 and authorized nearly three dozen new projects.3 A 
 
1 Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-121, 128 
Stat. 1193. 
2 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), commenting on the version of the WRRDA 
bill that would soon become law, noted that key provisions of the bill will: (1) “expand 
and clarify the Corps’ authority to control invasive aquatic species, implement flood 
W
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Congress notoriously reluctant to spend taxpayer dollars had enacted 
a bill with a federal price tag far exceeding $12 billion.4 And a 
Congress noted for partisan rancor and disagreement—arguably the 
least productive Congress in American history5—had approved this 
legislation by a combined vote of 503 to 11.6 
The nearly unanimous enactment of the WRRDA shows that there 
is still broad support, and strong demand, for some federal activities 
relating to water resources. In the arid West, however, any suggestion 
of a new federal role in water management is sure to collide with 
conventional wisdom and entrenched positions. Conventional wisdom 
has it that the federal government has consistently deferred to state 
water law, leaving states in charge of making water resource 
decisions.7 Moreover, western state officials, and traditional water 
users with rights protected by state law, adamantly insist that any 
federal involvement (or “interference”) in water matters must respect 
 
control and environmental protection projects, and assist Indian tribes with water resources 
projects”; (2) “direct the Corps to consult with the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency to develop a levee safety program and would reauthorize the Dam Safety 
Program”; and (3) “expand the Corps’ responsibilities for maintaining harbors and 
authorize the Corps and EPA to implement pilot projects and provide loans and loan 
guarantees to nonfederal entities to complete water infrastructure projects.” Letter from 
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to The Hon. Bill Shuster, Chairman, 
House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure (May 19, 2014) (on file with author). 
3 The CBO noted that the WRRDA will “authorize the construction of 34 new water-
related projects,” and also “increase the total costs allowable for construction of eight 
existing projects.” Id. 
4 The CBO estimated that the WRRDA would cost $5.4 billion to implement during the 
2015–19 period and $6.9 billion during the 2020–24 period, “with additional spending 
continuing for many years after 2024.” Id. 
5 See generally Ed O’Keefe & Sean Sullivan, Senate Abruptly Wraps Up, Capping 
Least Productive Congress in Modern History, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/another-republican-upends-the-senates-year-end  
-plans/2014/12/16/127292d8-8559-11e4-9534-f79a23c40e6c_story.html. 
6 The votes on final passage of the WRRDA conference report were 412–4 in the House 
and 91–7 in the Senate. H.R.3080–Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014, 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3080/all-info 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2014). 
7 The Supreme Court has declared that Congress has consistently deferred to state water 
law, especially in two opinions handed down on the same day and authored by then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978) (stating 
that the history of irrigation in the West shows a “consistent thread of purposeful and 
continued deference to state water law by Congress”); United States v. New Mexico, 438 
U.S. 696, 702 (1978) (“Where Congress has expressly addressed the question of whether 
federal entities must abide by state water law, it has almost invariably deferred to the state 
law.”). 
BENSON (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  11:22 AM 
688 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 685 
the “primary” role of states in water allocation and management.8 
These factors, and the failure of many efforts to establish anything 
like a federal water policy for the West,9 indicate the challenges that 
would be sure to confront any proposal for a new or expanded federal 
role in addressing the region’s important water issues. 
There is a competing argument, however, and it is not entirely 
radical: federal laws and institutions already play important roles in 
western water management, reflecting the reality that federal law has 
sometimes taken precedence to protect national interests in water 
resources.10 Despite questions about the appropriate federal role, 
Congress has already established hugely significant programs relating 
to water because it saw important problems of national significance 
that could not be resolved without federal intervention. Today, major 
western river basins are facing similarly significant problems, as 
limited water supplies are over-allocated, demands continue to 
increase, and climate change promises to exacerbate the West’s 
perennial problems of scarcity and variability. Solutions to such 
 
8 For example, in a 2014 policy statement, the Western Governors’ Association 
declared, “As the preeminent authority on water management within their boundaries, 
states have the right to develop, use, control and distribute the surface water and 
groundwater located within their boundaries, subject to international treaties and interstate 
agreements and judicial decrees.” W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, POLICY RESOLUTION 2014-03, 
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST ¶ B.1 (2014), available at http://www 
.westgov.org/images/stories/policies/Water_Resource_Management_in_the_West.pdf. The 
statement also insisted that “[t]he federal government has long recognized the right to use 
water as determined under the laws of the various states,” and that “[n]othing in any act of 
Congress or Executive Branch regulatory action should be construed as affecting or 
intending to affect states’ primacy over the allocation and administration of their water 
resources.” Id. ¶ B.1.a. For its part, the National Water Resources Association, a 
confederation of western water user organizations, takes the position that federal agencies 
have improperly used federal environmental laws in a way that is inconsistent with state 
water laws, and that 
[a]ny attempt to condition, restrict, or prohibit the appropriation, storage, carriage 
and consumptive use of water through regulation under federal environmental 
laws must be consistent with and take into account state water law. It is urged 
that the present Administration continue to support a strong system  of water 
allocation and management by the respective states. 
Position Statements, NAT’L WATER RES. COUNCIL ¶ 12, http://www.nwra.org/position      
-statements.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2014). 
9 See Janet C. Neuman, Federal Water Policy: An Idea Whose Time Will (Finally) 
Come, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 114–16 (2001) (explaining reasons why federal water 
policy does not exist). “The simple mention of ‘federal’ water policy in some parts of the 
western United States is akin to ordering a gardenburger at a cattlemen’s convention.” Id. 
at 115. 
10 See generally Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. 
State Authority Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241. 
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problems are likely to be expensive and will need to address national 
interests as well as state and local concerns. 
Thus, there is a strong rationale, and a growing imperative, for a 
new federal water policy for the West. Like the first two eras of 
federal water policy—water project development and environmental 
protection—the third wave will need to bring federal money to the 
table in proportion to the size of the problems to be solved. Federal 
money will come with important conditions, helping to ensure that 
western water problems are resolved in a way that meets national 
needs. 
This Article begins by summarizing the value of the federal role in 
western water management, symbolized by “the greenback, the 
humpback, and the silverback.” It then examines the first two waves 
of federal water policy, exploring how Congress employed a broadly 
similar approach to both building water supply projects and regulating 
water quality. The Article then turns to indications of modern 
demands for federal involvement in western water issues, and 
concludes with observations about important elements of a third wave 
of federal water policy for the West. 
I 
THE VALUE OF THE FEDERAL ROLE IN WATER MANAGEMENT 
Western states and water users have long regarded the federal role 
in water matters as problematic, and perhaps more trouble than it is 
worth.11 Some people oppose any new federal action relating to water 
 
11 Within a decade of Congress passing the 1902 Reclamation Act, Wyoming officials 
were voicing great resentment against the federal government for its activities and attitude 
in that state. T.A. LARSON, HISTORY OF WYOMING 357–58 (2d ed. 1978); see infra notes 
85–104 and accompanying text (explaining the 1902 Act). In 1909, the governor of 
Wyoming criticized federal agencies—presumably the Reclamation Service—“whose 
meddlesome activity frequently acts as a hindrance to our development, and hence irritates 
our people.” LARSON, supra note 11, at 357. The state engineer accused the agency of 
ignoring state laws, among other transgressions, and wrote “[t]he present attitude of the 
Reclamation Service must change radically before any real good can be accomplished in 
this state by it.” Id. at 358. In the 1950s and ’60s, one of the major controversies in federal 
water policy was the acreage limit for receiving subsidized water from Reclamation 
projects, which had always been a key part of the federal program; large landowners 
(especially in California) wanted the cheap water but rebelled against the acreage limits. 
See generally Paul S. Taylor, Excess Land Law: Calculated Circumvention, 52 CALIF. L. 
REV. 978 (1964). In 1971, the great water law scholar Frank Trelease wrote, 
When [federal] and state law clash, when gaps appear, when federal law upsets 
that which state law has set up . . . then there is federal-state conflict in the field 
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resources in the West, a view seemingly held by the current majority 
of the House Natural Resources Committee.12 The record shows, 
however, that federal laws, programs, and institutions have proved 
their worth in developing and protecting the nation’s waters. 
The value of federal involvement in this context can be 
summarized, or symbolized, by three things: the greenback, the 
humpback, and the silverback. The greenback, of course, is money: 
federal dollars spent on things such as infrastructure projects. The 
humpback refers to the humpback chub, a native fish species in the 
Colorado River system, representing national priorities (in this case 
endangered species) that would go more or less unprotected without 
federal law. Lastly, the silverback is a dominant male gorilla—a 
metaphor for the federal government’s role in ensuring that states 
meet their legal responsibilities despite local resistance—a role that 
former EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus once referred to as 
“the gorilla in the closet.”13 This Section briefly explains each of 
 
of water rights. There is confusion, uncertainty, bad feeling, jealousy and 
bitterness. To a substantial degree, this is what exists today. 
FRANK J. TRELEASE, NAT’L WATER COMM’N, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER 
LAW 11 (1971). 
12 For example, on June 24, 2014, the House Water and Power Subcommittee held a 
hearing entitled “New Federal Schemes to Soak Up Water Authority: Impacts on States, 
Water Users, Recreation, and Job’s [sic].” Press Release, House Comm. on Natural Res., 
Witnesses Agree Proposed Water Rights Regulations Continue the “Obama Knows Best” 
Water Policies (June 24, 2014), available at http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploaded 
files/6_24_14_wprelease.pdf. The Natural Resources Committee’s press release stated that 
recent federal agency actions “turn over longstanding water rights and eliminate multiple 
land and water uses on and off federal lands,” represent “executive agencies running 
amok,” and they “fundamentally alter . . . the relationship between the states and the 
federal government . . . .” Id. An earlier hearing focused on legislation, H.R. 3189, and its 
GOP sponsor said it would “protect local water rights from federal government overreach 
and takings . . . . ” Press Release, House Comm. on Natural Res., Witnesses, Members 
Agree Rep. Tipton’s Legislation Needed to Prevent Federal Water Grab (Oct. 10, 2013), 
available at http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/10_10_13_wp_tipton_leg.pdf. 
13 In his second stint as EPA administrator, Ruckelshaus said in a 1984 speech to EPA 
employees that although the states had the interest and capacity to control pollution, “[the 
EPA’s] responsibility is not to get along with the states, it is to insure compliance . . . 
unless [the states] have a gorilla in the closet, they can’t do the job. And the gorilla is the 
EPA.” Steven D. Shermer, The Efficiency of Private Participation in Regulating and 
Enforcing the Federal Pollution Control Laws: A Model for Citizen Involvement, 14 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 461, 466 (1999). While his comment referred to environmental 
regulation rather than water management, the states, whatever their intentions, have the 
same trouble standing up to their politically powerful water users as they do their polluting 
industries. In the water context, the federal “gorilla” can ensure that the states don’t just 
serve their local interests at the expense of the environment, tribes, or downstream states. 
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these sources of federal influence in the context of water 
management. 
A. The Greenback: Big Bucks to Address Big Challenges 
Some of the federal government’s most important contributions 
regarding water have involved spending large sums of money, often 
for infrastructure projects. In the first half of the twentieth century, 
project opponents unsuccessfully challenged the government’s 
authority to construct certain projects, arguing that some purposes 
exceeded Congress’ powers regarding water.14 Since 1950, however, 
it is clear that Congress may authorize construction of water projects 
under the General Welfare Clause and the constitutional spending 
power, without the need to rely on a traditional federal purpose such 
as navigation.15 
The construction and operation of federal water projects has 
transformed the nation’s aquatic landscape. In the West, the Bureau of 
Reclamation (Reclamation) built hundreds of dams, especially once 
the program expanded to serve municipal, industrial, and hydropower 
purposes;16 currently, Reclamation has 337 reservoirs in its 
portfolio.17 Nationally, the Corps was even more prolific, building 
nearly 700 dams for flood control, hydropower, and other purposes.18 
These projects represent a truly massive investment of federal funds, 
totaling roughly $22 billion for Reclamation projects alone.19 
 
14 See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) (upholding authorization of the 
Bureau of Reclamation’s Boulder Canyon Project on the Colorado River); Oklahoma ex 
rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (upholding authorization of the 
Corps’ Denison Dam on the Red River). 
15 United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738–39 (1950) (determining 
that the general welfare and spending powers supported authorization of the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River). 
16 See generally Donald J. Pisani, Federal Reclamation in the Twentieth Century: A 
Centennial Retrospective, in THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: HISTORY ESSAYS FROM 
THE CENTENNIAL SYMPOSIUM VOLUMES I AND II 611 (2008), available at http://www 
.usbr.gov/history/Symposium_2008/Historical_Essays.pdf. 
17 Bureau of Reclamation Quickfacts, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/facts.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2014). 
18 Dam Safety Program, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, http://www.usace.army.mil 
/Missions/CivilWorks/DamSafetyProgram.aspx (last visited Aug. 7, 2014). 
19 According to a 1996 GAO report, as of 1994, the federal government spent $21.8 
billion to construct 133 Reclamation water projects. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: INFORMATION ON ALLOCATION AND REPAYMENT OF COSTS 
OF CONSTRUCTING WATER PROJECTS 23 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 GAO REPORT]. There 
appears to be no parallel estimate of the total cost of all Army Corps of Engineers projects, 
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The costs of these projects cannot be measured solely in dollars, of 
course; the Corps and Reclamation are somewhat legendary for the 
environmental impacts of their handiwork.20 However, the 
corresponding benefits have been substantial. For example, 
Reclamation claims to deliver water to 10 million acres of farmland, 
generate 15% of the nation’s hydropower, supply municipal and 
industrial water for 31 million people, and host 90 million 
recreational visitor days annually.21 For its part, the Corps claims that 
its flood control projects save $3 billion per year in flood damages, 
that its reservoirs host more than 40 million visitor days,22 and that it 
generates 24% of the nation’s hydropower.23 
Federal money spent on water infrastructure has often yielded 
benefits, beyond the projects themselves, in the form of practical 
incentives for resolving looming disputes between sovereigns. 
Through much of the twentieth century, the lure of federal water 
projects helped motivate states to enter into compacts for allocating 
the water of interstate river systems. As stated by one authority, 
It has been suggested that “[m]ost compacts represent compromises 
reached by the water resource establishments of the signatory states 
against a background of urgent need (or at least desire) for federal 
benefits that are contingent upon agreement being reached.” The 
federal benefits typically were the funding and building of water 
development projects using interstate waters, projects that by 
common understanding were not likely to be funded by Congress 
 
but given that the Corps has roughly twice as many reservoirs as Reclamation, the number 
is almost certainly higher. 
20 In his chapter “The Go-Go Years,” Marc Reisner summed up the impacts of the peak 
period of federal dam construction on the nation’s rivers. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC 
DESERT 151–75 (1st ed. 1986). Congress authorized a huge number of Reclamation 
projects from 1928 to 1956, “along with hundreds of projects built by the Corps of 
Engineers in the East and West. In that astonishingly brief twenty-eight-year period . . . the 
most fateful transformation that has ever been visited on any landscape, anywhere, was 
wrought. It was a profound change—profound and permanent.” Id. at 172. Reisner’s 
summary of the impacts of the Corps’ efforts to improve navigation on the nation’s major 
river systems appears at page 177. 
21 Quickfacts, supra note 17. 
22 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Overview, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Media/FactSheets/FactSheetArticleView/tabid/219/Article/475
462/us-army-corps-of-engineers-overview.aspx (last visited Aug. 7, 2014). 
23 USACE Hydropower–Renewable, Reliable, Energy Independence for America, U.S. 
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (Apr. 10, 2013), available at http://www.usace.army.mil 
/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/budget/strongpt/fy2014sp_hydropower.pdf. 
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absent agreement by the affected states regarding allocation of the 
interstate waters.24 
More recently, federal money for water infrastructure and other 
tangible benefits for Indian Country has been a crucial element of 
tribal water rights settlements that help resolve bitter disputes over 
reserved right claims.25 For example, the Navajo Nation’s claims to 
water from the San Juan River in New Mexico were settled largely 
through authorization of a pipeline project costing more than $1 
billion, to be constructed almost entirely with federal funds.26 
B. The Humpback: Federal Law to Promote National Priorities 
Despite conventional wisdom about deference to state authority, 
federal water law has played a major role in the West for more than a 
century. The 1899 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Rio 
Grande Dam & Irrigation Co. showed that the federal government 
would sometimes be at odds with the states over water, and that 
federal law would not simply allow states to allocate water at the 
expense of national interests.27 In that case, the Court blocked a 
proposed dam on the Rio Grande in New Mexico that had been 
authorized under territorial law, applying a federal statute prohibiting 
“the creation of any obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by law, 
to the navigable capacity of any waters” subject to U.S. jurisdiction.28 
The Court also observed in dictum that a state could not deny the 
United States, as an owner of land along a stream, the right to such 
 
24 DOUGLAS L. GRANT & GREGORY S. WEBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER 
LAW 495 (8th ed. 2010) (quoting Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 48 (1966)). 
25 See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN 
LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 767–74 (7th ed. 2014) (summarizing tribal water settlements 
generally, and providing a table of approved settlements with the financial cost of each). 
“Virtually all [settlements] created trust funds of mostly federal money for tribes to invest 
in water development or economic development activities. The funds ranged from $6 
million to over $150 million.” Id. at 768. 
26 Jerold Widdison, Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project, in WATER MATTERS! 20-1, at 
20-3 to -5 (2014), available at http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/water-matters-2014/20        
-navajo-gallup-water-supply-project.pdf. This pipeline will also provide important off-
reservation benefits by bringing a sustainable water supply to the city of Gallup, New 
Mexico. Id. at 20-3. 
27 174 U.S. 690 (1899). 
28 Id. at 707 (quoting Rivers & Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 907, § 10, 26 
Stat. 426, 454 (1890) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2012))). 
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water “as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government 
property.”29 
The Court would soon give effect to those words in the landmark 
case of Winters v. United States, holding that an Indian reservation in 
Montana had an implied water right—under federal law—to the water 
needed for irrigation by its resident tribes.30 Although the treaty 
establishing the reservation said nothing about water, the Court held 
that water rights are essential to the treaty’s basic goal of helping 
tribes become farmers.31 The Court rejected arguments about state 
control over water resources in Winters,32 and did so again in Arizona 
v. California,33 reinforcing and clarifying the law as applied to Indian 
reservations,34 and establishing that other federally designated lands 
could have “reserved rights” to the water needed to fulfill their 
specific purposes.35 
The federal government has also asserted national priorities in 
hydropower—planning and promoting development of major 
hydroelectric projects—over state objections. Although the Federal 
Power Act contains at least two provisions that seem to give states 
significant authority regarding proposed hydropower projects,36 a 
series of Supreme Court cases interpreted those provisions narrowly, 
leaving a federal agency firmly in control of project licensing 
decisions.37 In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal 
 
29 Id. at 703. 
30 207 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1908). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 577. 
33 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
34 Id. at 597–600. 
35 Id. at 601. 
36 The Federal Power Act requires a federal license, issued by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, or FERC (formerly the Federal Power Commission), prior to 
construction of a hydropower project. 16 U.S.C. § 802 (2012). Section 9(b) of the statute 
requires a license applicant to show FERC that it has “complied with the requirements” of 
the laws of the state where the project will be located “with respect to bed and banks and 
to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power purposes.” Id. § 802(a)(2). In 
addition, section 27 provides that the Federal Power Act shall not be construed as 
impairing state laws “relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water 
used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein.” Id.  
§ 821. 
37 First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946); Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955); California v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 495 U.S. 490 (1990). In each of these cases, the Commission approved a project 
that would have had lesser environmental impacts if state law, or state agency 
recommendations, had been followed. 
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Power Commission, the Court held that giving full effect to those 
provisions would mean that a state could essentially have veto power 
over a federally licensed project, which “easily could destroy the 
effectiveness of the Federal [Power] Act . . . [and] subordinate to the 
control of the State the ‘comprehensive’ planning which the Act 
provides shall depend upon the judgment of the Federal Power 
Commission . . . .”38 
Most recently, Congress has established certain environmental 
goals as national priorities, most notably through the Clean Water Act 
(discussed below) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).39 The ESA 
seeks to conserve threatened and endangered species and the 
ecosystems on which they depend.40 Although the ESA is not specific 
to water-dependent species, it almost immediately became 
controversial in the context of water development, when the discovery 
and listing of the snail darter threatened to derail a nearly completed 
federal dam.41 In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Supreme 
Court held that the Tellico Dam could not be completed without 
violating the ESA, declaring “beyond doubt that Congress intended 
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.”42 And 
while Congress directed the dam to be completed, it made only 
modest changes to the law, preserving the statute’s strong protection 
for endangered species and their ecosystems.43 Since then the ESA 
has had a significant impact on water management in several places, 
particularly where federal water projects have a major effect on 
protected species and their ecosystems.44 
 
38 328 U.S. at 164. 
39 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544. 
40 The ESA’s purposes are found in section 1531(b), which refers first to conserving the 
ecosystems on which listed species depend, and second to conserving the species 
themselves. Id. § 1531(b). 
41 See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
42 Id. at 174. 
43 See Holly Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A Narrow Escape for a Broad New 
Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 109, 132 (Oliver A. Houck & Richard J. Lazarus 
eds. 2005). 
44 See Reed D. Benson, Avoiding Jeopardy, Without the Questions: Recovery 
Implementation Programs for Endangered Species in Western River Basins, 2 MICH J. 
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 473, 484–504 (2013) (describing the ESA’s impact on water project 
operations in various river basins). 
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C. The Silverback: Federal Oversight to Protect National Interests 
Interstate water allocation is perhaps the most obvious area where 
federal law and a federal forum for resolving disputes are necessary to 
ensure that an individual state does not promote its own interests at 
the expense of another state. Today this point is well accepted, even 
obvious, but in the early twentieth century it was a contested question 
of law. A threshold issue in the original Kansas v. Colorado case 
regarding the Arkansas River was whether the U.S. Supreme Court 
even had jurisdiction over such an action.45 Having resolved that 
question, the Court still had to determine whether federal law applied. 
Colorado and its water users argued that a state had absolute control 
over all the water within its boundaries and could allocate that water 
entirely for its own uses even if that left none for a downstream 
state.46 The Court held that federal law must apply where “the action 
of one State reaches through the agency of natural laws into the 
territory of another State,” and established the fundamental principle 
of equitable apportionment of interstate waters.47 Undeterred, 
Colorado made the same argument in a later case involving the 
Laramie River,48 but the Court again rejected it because it had already 
been “adjudged untenable.”49 
Interstate waters, especially in the West, have been allocated 
largely through compacts.50 Because each compact is a negotiated 
 
45 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 81–84 (1907). 
46 They also argued that each state had absolute control over its natural resources, and 
that federal involvement in interstate waters would undermine that control. Id. at 78–79. 
Colorado’s water users, especially the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company, seem to have 
pressed this argument harder than Colorado itself. Colorado’s main contention was that its 
use of the Arkansas River was not causing harm to Kansas. Id. at 62–64. On this issue, the 
Court found that Kansas was in fact being harmed, but that its injuries were relatively 
minor and localized, and denied relief on that basis. Id. at 112–18. 
47 Id. at 97–98. Although Kansas lost this case, the Court stated that Kansas could 
return if Colorado increased its depletions to Kansas’ detriment, “to the extent of 
destroying the equitable apportionment of benefits between the two States resulting from 
the flow of the river.” Id. at 118. 
48 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). 
49 Id. at 466. The Court noted that it had rejected this same argument in the Arkansas 
River litigation. Id. (“Further consideration satisfies us that the ruling was right.”). 
50 As of 2007 there were twenty-six interstate water compacts, mostly involving 
western states. Jerome C. Muys, George William Sherk & Marilyn C. O’Leary, Utton 
Transboundary Resources Center Model Interstate Water Compact, 47 NAT. RESOURCES 
J. 17, 21 (2007). 
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agreement between the states that share an interstate water body,51 
compacts might be seen as a means for states to control their own 
destinies and minimize the risk of federal “interference” in water 
management. However, that view is somewhat misleading because 
compacts have significant federal dimensions. Most fundamentally, 
Congress must approve each compact before it may take effect, which 
is not automatic;52 once approved, the compact becomes a federal 
statute.53 In addition, compacts typically contain provisions 
disclaiming any effects on the water rights of Indian tribes, the United 
States or its “agencies or instrumentalities,”54 recognizing that federal 
law may provide water rights for tribal and federal lands under the 
Winters doctrine.55 Moreover, compacts are typically enforced in the 
Supreme Court, which often solicits input from the U.S. government 
on whether to accept a case and on the merits of the dispute.56 With 
several interstate water disputes currently pending before the Supreme 
Court, three of them involving compacts,57 it is clear that the federal 
forum remains crucial even where states have agreed to a compact. 
 
51 The Supreme Court emphasized the negotiated agreement element of interstate water 
compacts in its recent decision in Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 
2120, 2130 (2013). 
52 For example, Congress never ratified the Truckee River Compact. John Kramer, 
Lake Tahoe, the Truckee River, and Pyramid Lake: The Past, Present, and Future of 
Interstate Water Issues, 19 PAC. L.J. 1339, 1340 (1988) (noting that the Truckee River 
Compact, approved by California and Nevada, “languished before Congress for fourteen 
years before hearings in 1985 and 1986 demonstrated that the consent and approval of 
Congress could not be obtained”). 
53 See Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2130 n.8. 
54 See, e.g., Rio Grande Compact, ch. 155, art. XVI, 53 Stat. 785, 792 (1939) (no effect 
on U.S. obligations to Indian tribes, or impairment of tribal rights); Upper Colorado River 
Basin Compact, chs. 47–48, art. XIX(a), (c), 63 Stat. 31, 42 (1949) (no effect on 
“obligations of the United States of America to Indian tribes,” or on “rights or powers of 
the United States of America, its agencies or instrumentalities, in or to the waters of the 
Upper Colorado River System, or its capacity to acquire rights in and to the use of said 
waters”); Yellowstone River Compact, ch. 629, arts. VI & XVI(a), 65 Stat. 663, 668, 670 
(1951) (no effect on tribal rights or federal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or capacity to acquire 
water rights). 
55 See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text. 
56 See generally John B. Draper & Jeffrey J. Wechsler, Gunboats on the Colorado: 
Interstate Water Controversies, Past and Present, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18-1,      
§ 18.02(3)(a) (2009). 
57 The pending cases were brought by Kansas (on the Republican River Compact), 
Montana (on the Yellowstone River Compact), and Texas (on the Rio Grande Compact). 
The other interstate case in the Supreme Court involves the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-
Flint system in the Southeast, where there is no current compact. 
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In the context of tribal reserved rights, the Supreme Court 
recognized the importance of federal oversight of state courts, even as 
it handed the states a major victory in allowing them to adjudicate 
tribal water right claims. The Court decided in 1976 that a federal 
statute (the “McCarran Amendment”)58 established a strong 
Congressional policy of having a single proceeding, often in state 
court, to determine all water right claims (including federal and tribal) 
for a single river basin.59 In Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of 
Arizona,60 the Court recognized potentially serious problems with 
having state courts adjudicate tribal claims,61 but insisted that tribal 
rights would nonetheless be protected. For one thing, federal law 
would continue to govern tribal water claims, which state courts 
“have a solemn obligation to follow.”62 “Moreover, any state-court 
decision alleged to abridge Indian water rights protected by federal 
law can expect to receive, if brought for review before this Court, a 
particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate with the powerful 
federal interest in safeguarding those rights from state 
encroachment.”63 
In the regulatory context, Congress has repeatedly established 
national programs for addressing environmental problems by 
allowing states to implement federal standards, subject to federal 
agency oversight.64 The Clean Air Act offers a clear illustration: it 
requires the EPA to set national standards for air quality,65 calls on 
states to ensure attainment of those standards through “State 
Implementation Plans,”66 but requires EPA approval of such plans.67 
 
58 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2012). 
59 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 820–21 (1976). 
60 463 U.S. 545 (1983). 
61 Id. at 566–69. 
62 Id. at 571. 
63 Id. However, the Supreme Court’s interest in actually protecting tribal water rights 
has been questioned, in light of its handling of the challenge to the Wyoming Supreme 
Court’s decision on the water rights of the Wind River Reservation. See generally Andrew 
C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in Wyoming v. 
United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1997). 
64 See Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from 
Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered 
Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 78–79 (2002) (summarizing the important roles 
given to states in implementing federal pollution control law, and describing this approach 
as cooperative federalism). 
65 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012). 
66 Id. § 7410. 
67 Id. § 7410(k). 
BENSON (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  11:22 AM 
2015] The Greenback, the Humpback, and the Silverback: 699 
How a Third Wave of Federal Water Policy Could Benefit the West 
The Safe Drinking Water Act68 provides another example, directing 
the EPA to develop national standards for drinking water quality;69 
allowing a state to take over primary responsibility for enforcing these 
standards if EPA determines that its laws and institutions are 
adequate;70 and authorizing the EPA to file its own enforcement 
action if a state fails to respond adequately to the EPA’s direction.71 
In the water context, however, the best-known example of this 
approach is the Clean Water Act, as explained below.72 
In summary, the importance of the federal role in water 
management is shown by the greenback, the humpback, and the 
silverback; that is, the federal government is an important player 
because of its singular capacity to address major challenges by 
spending big money, by setting and protecting national priorities, and 
by providing a necessary check on state actions. The next Part 
examines how Congress has applied these principles, while providing 
important roles for state laws and institutions, in two distinctly 
different eras of federal water policy. 
II 
TWO WAVES OF FEDERAL WATER POLICY: DIFFERING GOALS, 
SIMILAR ELEMENTS 
The twentieth century brought two well-recognized waves of 
federal water policy73: water project development and environmental 
 
68 Id. §§ 300f to 300j-26. 
69 Id. § 300g-1. 
70 Id. § 300g-2. 
71 Id. § 300g-3. 
72 See infra notes 111–34 and accompanying text. 
73 In a recent book looking at issues of water management in nations with federal 
systems, noted water scholar Andrea Gerlak identified four “streams” of U.S. water policy 
beginning in 1900. Andrea K. Gerlak, Federalism in US Water Policy, in FEDERAL 
RIVERS: MANAGING WATER IN MULTI-LAYERED POLITICAL SYSTEMS  41, 43–48 (Dustin 
Garrick et al. eds., 2014). The titles and periods she identified for these streams were: 
Federal Development and Dominance (1900–1960), Development Doubts and 
Environmental Concerns (1960s to 1980s), Devolution and Penny-Pinching (1980s), and 
Restoration and Collaboration (1990s–present). Id. Gerlak’s four “streams” may provide a 
more complete and nuanced view of twentieth century water policy than my two “waves,” 
and she is correct in suggesting that environmental protection has been a lower priority (at 
least for Congress) since the 1980s. However, I have simplified twentieth century federal 
water policy into two overlapping eras because each of these two eras has left a legacy that 
remains largely in place today: federally operated water projects (operated mostly by 
Reclamation and the Corps) and federal environmental laws (such as the Clean Water Act 
and ESA). 
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protection. The first wave, which emphasized dam construction, 
lasted into the 1970s;74 the second wave, which focused on river 
conservation and water quality regulation, began in the 1960s.75 
Given their sharply different goals, and the common understanding 
that the rise of environmental concerns helped bring an end to the 
dam-building era,76 one might think that these two waves of federal 
water policy were nothing alike. However, the two waves—and 
especially their flagship programs—had some fundamental and 
important similarities. 
A. The First Wave: Dam Construction and the 1902 Reclamation Act 
Once Congress decided that impounding rivers was good and 
important work for the U.S. government,77 it directed several 
agencies to pursue water project development. The Federal Power Act 
of 192078 established the Federal Power Commission (now the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC) and directed it to 
issue licenses for hydropower projects on navigable waters.79 The 
Army Corps of Engineers built hundreds of projects on rivers across 
the country, primarily for flood control; its string of six large dams on 
the Missouri River, authorized in 1944 under the Pick-Sloan Plan,80 
represent the largest system of reservoirs on any U.S. river.81 The 
New Deal era Tennessee Valley Authority82 built more than four 
dozen reservoirs in seven southeastern states, largely for hydropower 
 
74 See Pisani, supra note 16, at 625. 
75 See David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal 
Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States’ Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 14–17 
(2001). 
76 Id.; see also Pisani, supra note 16, at 625. 
77 Reisner describes the origins of federal dam building by Reclamation and the Corps 
in terms that often reflect as poorly on Congress as on the agencies. REISNER, supra note 
20, at 115–20 (Reclamation); id. at 179–82 (Corps). 
78 The 1920 statute was originally called the Federal Water Power Act. Federal Water 
Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920). Since amended and expanded many times, the 
Federal Power Act is now codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 792 to 825r. 
79 Id. §§ 1, 4. One of the more important Supreme Court decisions on federal authority 
over water involved FERC’s hydropower licensing program. United States v. Appalachian 
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). 
80 The Supreme Court summarized the history of Pick-Sloan and the 1944 statute in 
ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 500–05 (1988). 
81 John H. Davidson, Marketing Missouri River Water: Competing Plans for 
Commoditizing a Natural Resource, 89 N.D. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013). 
82 A rather self-congratulatory history appears on the TVA website. From the New Deal 
to a New Century, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., http://www.tva.com/abouttva/history.htm (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2014). 
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and economic development.83 But the original federal dam-building 
program was launched by the 1902 Reclamation Act;84 under this 
statute and later enactments,85 Reclamation built hundreds of projects 
in seventeen western states, primarily for irrigation.86 
In the original Reclamation Act, Congress established the 
Reclamation Fund87 and authorized the Interior Department to use the 
money to build and operate projects to store and deliver water for 
irrigation.88 These projects would supply water to private farmers, 
who were required to live on or near the irrigated land and were 
limited to irrigating no more than 160 acres.89 Farmers receiving 
water from a project would be responsible for repaying the 
government for the costs of building that project, interest free, within 
ten years.90 Over the years, Congress expanded the purposes of 
Reclamation projects, relaxed the repayment terms, and eventually 
raised the acreage cap on farms eligible for project water.91 For 
purposes of this Article, however, three basic elements of the program 
have remained consistent. 
First, the Reclamation program has always represented a major 
federal investment in water development, by which water is delivered 
at a substantial subsidy. While this subsidy was originally rather 
modest—essentially a ten-year, interest-free loan to farmers receiving 
project water—it soon grew to the point where irrigators commonly 
 
83 See Frequently Asked Questions About TVA, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., http://www.tva 
.com/abouttva/keyfacts.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2014). 
84 Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 43 
U.S.C. §§ 371–498 (2012)). 
85 The Reclamation program has long proceeded under two types of statutes: those that 
provide authority and direction for the program as a whole and those that pertain to a 
particular project, location, or activity. See generally Reed D. Benson, New Adventures of 
the Old Bureau: Modern-Day Reclamation Statutes and Congress’s Unfinished 
Environmental Business, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 137, 140–67 (2011) (examining both site-
specific enactments and programmatic statutes relating to Reclamation since 2000). 
86 Id. at 140 n.16. 
87 The Reclamation Fund was established in Section 1 of the 1902 Act, codified at 43 
U.S.C. § 391. 
88 Id. Section 2 of the 1902 Act authorized the Interior Department to construct 
irrigation projects; as amended, it is now codified at 43 U.S.C. § 411. 
89 These requirements, since repealed, were set out in Section 5 of the 1902 Act, 32 
Stat. at 389. 
90 This long-gone requirement appeared in Section 4 of the 1902 Act, 32 Stat. at 389. 
91 See Benson, supra note 85, at 159–60. 
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repaid only a minor fraction of project costs.92 While opinions differ 
on whether the federal investment in irrigation has been sound policy, 
there is no question that taxpayers have shouldered much of the 
burden of storing and delivering water to western farmers.93 
Second, the Reclamation program has worked within the water 
rights systems of the western states. Section 8 of the 1902 
Reclamation Act not only recognized state laws “relating to the 
control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation,” 
but also required the Interior Department to “proceed in conformity 
with such laws” in implementing the program.94 This provision 
remains on the books, and in 1978, a divided Supreme Court 
interpreted Section 8 to allow states to impose conditions on federal 
water projects so long as those conditions are “not inconsistent” with 
relevant congressional directives.95 
Third, Congress has always placed important requirements and 
restrictions on the Reclamation program that are both general and 
project specific. The original 1902 Act, for example, authorized the 
reclamation program for the single purpose of irrigation;96 imposed 
acreage and residency restrictions on farmers who could receive 
project water;97 fixed the terms for repayment of project costs;98 and 
specified that even after repayment was completed, “title to and the 
management and operation of the reservoirs and the works necessary 
for their protection and operation shall remain in the Government 
until otherwise provided by Congress.”99 Congress would later revise 
the program to require that repayment contracts be made with districts 
 
92 1996 GAO REPORT, supra note 19, 15–22 (describing forms of subsidies provided to 
irrigators receiving water from Reclamation projects). 
93 According to the 1996 GAO Report, as of 1994, the federal government has spent 
nearly $22 billion on Reclamation projects, of which $16.8 billion was considered 
“reimbursable” by project beneficiaries. Id. at 23. Of that total, $7.1 billion had been 
allocated to irrigation, but irrigators were required to repay only $3.4 billion and had 
actually repaid less than $1 billion. Id. 
94 Most of Section 8 of the 1902 Act is codified at 43 U.S.C. § 383. 
95 California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674 (1978). 
96 Section 2 of the 1902 Act, 32 Stat. at 388, authorized the Interior Department to 
construct “irrigation works.” 
97 Section 5 of the 1902 Act, 32 Stat. at 389, established these restrictions. 
98 Section 4 of the 1902 Act, 32 Stat. at 389, provided for repayment of construction 
costs by project irrigators over a ten-year period. 
99 Section 6 of the 1902 Act, 32 Stat. at 389, contained this proviso, which is codified at 
43 U.S.C. § 498. 
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rather than individual farmers,100 expand the program to include 
municipal and industrial water supply,101 and require conservation 
plans from those entities with contracts for project water.102 In 
addition, project-specific statutes would address such matters as the 
authorized uses of project water and even the types of crops that could 
be grown with it.103 Thus, despite the general statement of deference 
to state law in Section 8, Congress has established numerous 
conditions on the Reclamation program and individual projects, 
reflecting the federal policy of the day. 
B. The Second Wave: Environmental Protection and the 1972 Clean 
Water Act 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted several laws with the 
potential to restrict development and use of water resources. For 
example, the 1968 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act designated river 
segments that would then be protected from water project 
development, among other things.104 The National Environmental 
Policy Act,105 sometimes called the “Magna Carta” of U.S. 
environmental laws,106 required a detailed environmental analysis 
before a federal agency could permit, fund, or take any action that 
could have significant environmental impacts.107 In addition, the 
 
100 Act of May 25, 1926, ch. 383, § 46, 44 Stat. 636, 649 (codified as amended at 43 
U.S.C. § 423e (2012)). 
101 Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 9(c), 53 Stat. 1187, 1194 (codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c)) (providing for forty-year repayment contracts, with 
interest, for municipal water supply or “miscellaneous purposes,” provided that such 
contracts do not interfere with irrigation). 
102 Congress established this requirement in the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. 
L. No. 97-293, § 210, 96 Stat. 1261, 1268 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 390jj). 
103 For example, in authorizing the San Angelo Project in Texas, Congress not only 
specified project purposes (including “irrigation of approximately ten thousand acres of 
land in Tom Green County”), but also provided that no project water could be used to 
grow surplus crops for the first ten years. Act of Aug. 16, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-152, §§ 1, 
2(d), 71 Stat. 372, 372–73 (1957). 
104 Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.  
§§ 1271–1287 (2012)). The statutory protection from water project development is found 
at 16 U.S.C. § 1278. 
105 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.  
§§ 4321–4370f (2012)). 
106 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE NEPA: HAVING YOUR 
VOICE HEARD 2 (2007). 
107 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Although the statute is certainly not specific to water, one of 
the primary factors motivating some members of Congress in enacting NEPA was reining 
in the federal “mission” agencies, such as the Corps, that were intent on building 
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ESA108 established powerful protections for animal and plant species 
threatened with extinction.109 However, the Clean Water Act110 is the 
most ambitious environmental law specific to water. 
Although Congress had previously enacted measures aiming to 
reduce water pollution, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972111 dramatically increased federal involvement 
in water quality protection.112 The Clean Water Act begins with a 
sweeping objective “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,”113 and establishes 
lofty national goals for cutting pollution discharges and attaining 
water quality by the mid-1980s.114 The law prohibits any person from 
discharging pollutants to water except in compliance with specified 
provisions of the statute;115 directs the EPA to develop technology-
based “effluent limitations” for discharge of pollutants from point 
sources;116 and sets up separate permitting programs for the discharge 
of pollutants into water (under section 402)117 and the discharge of 
dredged or fill material (under section 404).118 In addition to 
restricting pollutant discharges, the Clean Water Act requires states to 
set standards that protect the quality of individual water bodies,119 
 
environmentally harmful projects. A. Dan Tarlock, The Story of Calvert Cliffs: A Court 
Construes the National Environmental Policy Act to Create a Powerful Cause of Action, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 77, 85–88 (Oliver A. Houck & Richard J. Lazarus eds., 
2005). 
108 Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.  
§§ 1531–1544 (2012)). 
109 See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text. 
110 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
111 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). 
112 “[D]espite the prominent roles Congress left for the states, the 1972 Act was a 
congressional statement of the need for a greater federal role in water quality regulation.    
. . . [U]nder the new statute, water quality regulation was subject to extensive federal 
oversight for the first time.” Robin Kundis Craig, Beyond SWANCC: The New Federalism 
and Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 33 ENVTL. L. 113, 124 (2003). 
113 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
114 Id. § 1251(a)(1)–(2). 
115 Id. § 1311(a). The statute defines “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any 
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,” and “point source” as “any 
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be 
discharged.” Id. § 1362(12), (14). “Pollutant” is broadly defined to include a wide range of 
materials, plus heat. Id. § 1362(6). 
116 Id. § 1311(b). “Point source” is defined in the prior footnote. 
117 Id. § 1342(a). 
118 Id. § 1344(a). 
119 Id. § 1313(c)(2). 
BENSON (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  11:22 AM 
2015] The Greenback, the Humpback, and the Silverback: 705 
How a Third Wave of Federal Water Policy Could Benefit the West 
subject to EPA oversight.120 Finally, the statute provides for both 
federal grants and loans to construct publicly owned wastewater 
treatment plants.121 
The Clean Water Act shares three big-picture similarities with the 
Reclamation program. First, Congress has delivered sizable federal 
infrastructure subsidies through grant and loan programs for 
wastewater treatment works. According to the EPA, the current Clean 
Water State Revolving Fund program has delivered more than $100 
billion to finance wastewater infrastructure over the past twenty-plus 
years, providing more than 33,000 low-interest loans;122 an earlier 
federal grant program for wastewater infrastructure had provided 
more than $41 billion in federal spending through 1984, making it 
“the largest nonmilitary public works program[] since the Interstate 
Highway System.”123 By funding these grants and loans, Congress 
has effectuated the “national policy that Federal financial assistance 
be provided to construct publicly owned waste treatment works.”124 
Second, the Clean Water Act reflects Congress’ recognition of the 
states’ lead role in allocating water. Most specifically, section 101(g) 
states “the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to 
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be 
superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired” by the Clean Water 
Act, and state water rights shall not be superseded or abrogated.125 
More generally, section 510 declares that the statute does not affect 
“any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters 
(including boundary waters) of such States.”126 In addition to these 
statements, the Clean Water Act allows the states to exercise 
important regulatory authorities, such as setting quality standards for 
their water bodies,127 certifying that certain federally licensed or 
 
120 Id. § 1313(c)(3). 
121 See id. §§ 1281–1301 (construction grants for publicly owned treatment works); id. 
§§ 1381–1387 (state water pollution control revolving funds). 
122 Clean Water State Revolving Fund, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa 
.gov/grants_funding/cwsrf/cwsrf_index.cfm (last visited Aug. 8, 2014). 
123 CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WATER INFRASTRUCTURE 
FINANCING: HISTORY OF EPA APPROPRIATIONS 1 (2012). 
124 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4). 
125 Id. § 1251(g). The third and final sentence of “the Wallop Amendment” requires 
federal agencies to “co-operate with State and local agencies to develop comprehensive 
solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing 
water resources.” Id. 
126 Id. § 1370. 
127 Id. § 1313(c)(2). 
BENSON (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  11:22 AM 
706 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 685 
permitted activities will not violate state standards,128 and issuing 
permits for the discharge of pollutants at industrial outfalls and other 
“point sources.”129 
Third, Congress designed the Clean Water Act to promote national 
goals of restoring and protecting water quality and gave the EPA 
power to set standards and oversee state activities to ensure progress 
toward those goals. For example, although states set water quality 
standards under section 303, the EPA must review each standard for 
consistency with the statute, order changes if necessary, and set the 
standard itself if the state refuses to make the required changes.130 
Although states can get EPA approval to issue pollutant discharge 
permits under section 402, they must notify the EPA of each permit 
they propose to issue, and the EPA can raise objections and issue the 
permit itself if the state does not resolve them.131 Section 510, titled 
“State Authority,” allows states to adopt and enforce their own water 
pollution control standards, but only if they are no less stringent than 
applicable federal standards.132 In short, the Clean Water Act gives 
states significant powers and duties in controlling pollution,133 but 
also directs the EPA to ensure that they adequately serve the national 
interest in restoring and protecting water quality. 
C. Comparing the First Two Waves: Obvious Differences, Important 
Similarities 
At first glance, the Reclamation laws and the Clean Water Act are 
only similar in that they are both federal statutes relating to water. 
One deals with water quantity and use, the other with water 
quality.134 The former authorized a public works program carried out 
 
128 Id. § 1341(a). 
129 Id. § 1342(b). States must gain EPA approval to operate this permitting program, 
but such approval is required if a state demonstrates that it meets nine statutory criteria. Id. 
130 Id. § 1313(c)(3). 
131 Id. § 1342(d). 
132 Id. § 1370(1). 
133 Section 1251(b) also states “the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and 
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution . . . .” Id. § 1251(b). 
134 In a notable case upholding the state of Washington’s use of its Clean Water Act 
authority to require a new hydropower project to maintain adequate in-stream flows for 
fish habitats, the Supreme Court rejected an argument to the effect 
that the Clean Water Act is only concerned with water “quality,” and does not 
 allow the regulation of water “quantity.” This is an artificial distinction. In many 
 cases, water quantity is closely related to water quality; a sufficient lowering of 
 the water quantity in a body of water could destroy all of its designated uses . . . . 
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by the Interior Department, the latter a regulatory program run by the 
Environmental Protection Agency. The reclamation laws make water 
available for beneficial use, to promote economic development; the 
Clean Water Act requires water pollution controls that impose 
restrictions and costs on economic activities. The 1902 Act sought to 
dam and divert western rivers in service of human productivity, 
whereas the 1972 Act sought to restore and maintain the integrity of 
the nation’s waters. Philosophically, these laws could hardly be more 
different. 
However, in significant respects the Reclamation laws and the 
Clean Water Act took similar approaches in addressing their 
respective challenges. As explained above, both delivered major 
federal investments in important water infrastructure. Both recognized 
state primacy in water allocation and provided important roles for 
state laws and institutions. And both specified key national 
priorities—such as the farm acreage limits of the Reclamation 
program and the point source pollution controls under the Clean 
Water Act—that would override any conflicting state law. 
The unexpected similarities of the 1902 Reclamation Act and the 
Clean Water Act extend to some of the circumstances surrounding 
their enactment. In considering both pieces of legislation, Congress 
faced serious questions about whether it was appropriate to expand 
the federal government’s involvement with water. In the early 1900s, 
the push for federal support of western irrigation was met with 
concerns over whether building water projects was an appropriate 
federal role, and whether a federal water development program would 
interfere with state water allocation authority and water rights.135 In 
the early 1970s, many sharply criticized the proposed amendments to 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act under the rationale that 
Congress should leave water allocation and regulation to state 
control.136 
 
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719 (1994). 
135 DONALD J. PISANI, TO RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 1848–1902, at 306 (1st ed. 1992) (noting “strong opposition” to a federal 
Reclamation program by three senators “who opposed the creation of any bureau that 
might threaten state administrative control over water”); id. at 309 (identifying specific 
concerns of Rocky Mountain states and their allies over any federal program to build and 
operate water projects). 
136 See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based 
Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10329, 10332–35 (1997) 
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Given these strongly expressed concerns about the role of the 
federal government in water development and regulation, what led to 
the enactment of these statutes? In both cases, Congress perceived a 
problem of national importance that, as a practical matter, local or 
state governments were unlikely to resolve. With the 1902 
Reclamation Act, Congress brought federal resources to bear in 
building major water projects to store and deliver water for 
irrigation—a challenge that had proved too great for the private sector 
and even state governments in most areas of the nineteenth century 
West.137 A federal irrigation program for the West came to be viewed 
as a national imperative, even an obligation, providing necessary 
support for regional development where the U.S. government had 
sought to draw settlers.138 As for the Clean Water Act, the 
“environmental decade” of the 1970s saw a groundswell of pressure 
for national action to combat the growing problem of water 
pollution—a matter that Congress first addressed in 1948, but had 
largely left to the states.139 While many states, along with industrial 
and business interests, argued against federal limits on water 
pollution, the Clean Water Act showed that Congress saw water 
quality as a national priority that only national action could 
address.140 
Thus, the 1902 Reclamation Act and 1972 Clean Water Act 
became the law of the land despite strong concerns that they would 
bring too much federal involvement in water matters that the states 
 
(providing extensive quotes from opponents of a greater federal role in water quality 
regulation). 
137 PISANI, supra note 135, at 104–18 (describing the general failure of large-scale 
private irrigation enterprises); id. at 251–65 (describing the failure of the federal Carey 
Act, which sought to promote development of irrigation projects supported by the western 
states). 
138 See id. at 318–25 (describing arguments in favor of the 1902 Reclamation Act by 
legislative proponents and President Roosevelt). 
139 Houck, supra note 136, at 10331–32 (noting the push for federal water quality 
protection and summarizing the 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act and 1965 Water 
Quality Act). 
140 For example, the acting chair of a congressional committee lashed out at critics of 
federal water quality legislation at a 1971 hearing on the subject: 
We left it to the States, year after year, and we didn’t get a single thing but a 
bunch of nursery rhymes as to the Constitution , and we didn’t get any clean 
water until the Federal Government insisted upon it and made some dollars 
available to the State for that use. 
Water Pollution Control Legislation—1971: Hearings on H.R. 11895 and H.R. 11896 
Before the H. Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong. 273 (1971) (statement of Rep. Robert E. 
Jones, Member, H. Comm. on Public Works). 
BENSON (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  11:22 AM 
2015] The Greenback, the Humpback, and the Silverback: 709 
How a Third Wave of Federal Water Policy Could Benefit the West 
regarded as their business. Nonetheless, Congress acted to tackle 
major national problems that were too important and too challenging 
to leave unaddressed by the states. In adopting these laws, Congress 
preserved significant roles for state governments and state laws, but 
also established key national policies for water development and 
environmental protection and backed those policies with a serious 
investment of federal dollars. Thus, these landmark laws—
representing two distinctly different waves of federal water policy—
have common themes in their origin stories and their approaches. The 
next Part suggests that Congress could return to this approach as the 
West faces increasingly serious water management challenges in an 
era of over-allocation and climate change. 
III 
SERIOUS PROBLEMS, EXPENSIVE SOLUTIONS: WHY THE WEST COULD 
USE A THIRD WAVE 
Given the usual fear and loathing surrounding the federal 
government’s involvement in water issues, one might expect to find 
little demand for new federal legislation or spending on water 
resource matters. The passage of the WRRDA in 2014,141 which 
astonishingly won nearly unanimous approval in Congress, suggests 
otherwise. Skeptics might argue that the WRRDA focused on 
navigation, flood control, and other core Corps functions and had 
little to do with water supply issues or the West. But that is not an 
entirely accurate picture, because the WRRDA does include 
important provisions relating to water supply, largely focused on the 
West.142 Beyond the WRRDA, however, the likely demand for new 
 
141 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
142 Section 1046 of the WRRDA, titled “Reservoir Operations and Water Supply,” 
requires the Corps to assess “management practices, priorities, and authorized purposes at 
Corps of Engineers reservoirs in arid regions to determine the effects of such practices, 
priorities, and purposes on water supply during periods of drought”; as part of this 
assessment, the Corps must “identify actions that can be carried out within the scope of 
existing authorities of the Secretary to increase project flexibility for the purpose of 
mitigating drought impacts.” Pub. L. No. 113-121, § 1046(a), 128 Stat. 1193, 1251 (2014). 
This section also prohibits the Corps from charging a fee over the next ten years for 
contracts to receive “surplus” water from Upper Missouri mainstem reservoirs. Id.             
§ 1046(c), 128 Stat. at 1254. For background on the purposes of this provision, which 
relates to energy development in North Dakota, see Davidson, supra note 81, at 15–17. 
 Perhaps most remarkably, Section 4008, titled “Rural Western Water,” authorizes the 
Corps to provide “design and construction assistance for water-related environmental 
infrastructure and resource protection and development in Idaho, Montana, rural Nevada, 
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federal involvement in western water is apparent from a bill that 
Congress enacted in 2009, from recent activity on Capitol Hill, and 
from the looming, enormous challenges facing western river basins 
and water managers. This Part briefly examines some of these factors 
that suggest interest in new federal water initiatives and considers 
their implications for future federal water policy. 
A. The 2009 Public Lands (and Water) Bill 
When Congress passed the giant Omnibus Public Land 
Management Act of 2009,143 it included numerous provisions dealing 
with water in the West. These provisions are diverse, and some do not 
fit neatly into a single category, but on the whole they reflect an 
emphasis on three areas: (1) authorizing new water projects,144 more 
than a dozen in all, such as the Tumalo Irrigation District Water 
Conservation Project in Oregon,145 the Eastern New Mexico Rural 
Water Supply System Project,146 and the Riverside-Corona Feeder 
Project in California’s Bunker Hill Groundwater Basin;147 (2) 
authorizing and funding environmental restoration programs of a 
more or less collaborative nature, including endangered fish recovery 
programs in the Upper Colorado and San Juan River Basins,148 the 
“Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program,”149 and 
a program to restore flows and salmon to the San Joaquin River under 
the terms of a court-approved settlement;150 and (3) supporting tribal 
 
New Mexico, rural Utah, and Wyoming,” which may include “water supply and related 
facilities,” and “surface water resource protection and development.” Id. § 4008, 128 Stat. 
at 1316. A similar authorization in the Water Resources Development Act of 1999 had 
been limited to Montana and rural Nevada. Pub. L. No. 106-53, § 595, 113 Stat. 269, 383 
(1999). Congress also authorized a Rural Water Supply program within Reclamation in 
2006. See Benson, supra note 85, at 162–63. 
143 Pub. L. No. 111-11, 123 Stat. 991 (2009). 
144 Congress also addressed existing water projects, however, through an “Aging 
Infrastructure” provision dealing with inspections and maintenance of older Reclamation 
project facilities, for purposes of protecting public safety. Id. §§ 9601–9605, 123 Stat. at 
1346–49. 
145 Id. § 9101, 123 Stat. at 1298. 
146 Id. § 9103, 123 Stat. at 1300–03. 
147 Id. § 9112, 123 Stat. at 1318–19. 
148 Id. § 9107, 123 Stat. at 1309–10. The Upper Colorado and San Juan endangered fish 
programs were the original Recovery Implementation Programs, or RIPs, designed to 
balance the habitat needs of endangered fish with water use and development activities. 
For an explanation of these and other RIPs, see Benson, supra note 44, at 505–23. 
149 Id. §§ 9401–9404, 123 Stat. at 1327–29. For a brief explanation of this program on 
the Lower Colorado River, see Benson, supra note 44, at 502–04. 
150 Id. §§ 10001–10203, 123 Stat. at 1349–67. 
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water settlements by approving the Navajo Nation settlement in New 
Mexico151 and the Duck Valley Reservation settlement in Idaho,152 
and by establishing a new Reclamation Water Settlements Fund to 
help ensure that future funding would be available for approved tribal 
water settlements.153 This 2009 bill also included the SECURE Water 
Act, by which Congress authorized a grant program for purposes such 
as conserving water, promoting markets, and providing habitats for 
imperiled species;154 it further directed Reclamation to study the 
potential impacts of climate change on water resources in the West 
and to develop strategies for mitigating those impacts.155 
B. Recent Congressional Activity 
The 113th Congress saw several requests for new federal authority 
and funding to address water-related challenges in the West. Drought 
relief has been a top priority, as the House and Senate passed 
competing and sharply divergent bills to address problems in parched 
California.156 While California has grabbed the headlines, other 
drought relief legislation has also been introduced, including a 
measure specifically for New Mexico,157 a bill to reauthorize 
Reclamation’s drought relief program for all the western states,158 
and a “Water in the 21st Century Act” that would promote drought 
preparedness and resilience through a variety of new and expanded 
programs.159 Another legislative push has involved the Klamath River 
 
151 Id. §§ 10601–10704, 123 Stat. at 1379–1405. 
152 Id. §§ 10801–10809, 123 Stat. at 1405–14. 
153 Id. § 10501, 123 Stat. at 1375–79. Although money from this fund is not technically 
limited to tribal water settlements, the statute prioritizes certain tribal settlements in New 
Mexico, Montana, and Arizona. Id. § 10501(c)(2)–(3), 123 Stat. at 1376. 
154 The statute authorized the Interior Secretary to provide grants and make cooperative 
agreements with “any eligible applicant to assist the eligible applicant in planning, 
designing, or constructing any improvement” for a range of purposes. Id. § 9504(a)(1), 123 
Stat. at 1334. 
155 Id. § 9503(b), 123 Stat. at 1332–33. 
156 A Congressional Research Service report provides a useful summary of the two bills 
and their vastly disparate provisions. PERVAZE A. SHEIKH, BETSY A. CODY & CHARLES 
V. STERN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL RESPONSE TO DROUGHT IN CALIFORNIA: 
AN ANALYSIS OF S. 2198 AND H.R. 3964 (July 17, 2014). House and Senate negotiators 
were unable to agree on California drought legislation in the 113th Congress, but the two 
sides have not given up efforts to find a compromise. Debra Kahn & Nick Juliano, 
Drought Bill Negotiations ‘Hot and Heavy’–Feinstein, E&E DAILY (Jan. 8, 2015). 
157 New Mexico Drought Relief Act of 2014, S. 2470, 113th Cong. (2014). 
158 S. 659, 113th Cong. (2013). 
159 Water in the 21st Century Act, H.R. 5363, S. 2771, 113th Cong. (2014). 
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Basin in Oregon and California, where diverse players have 
negotiated a series of agreements to resolve that basin’s longstanding 
conflicts over water for irrigation, wildlife refuges, and fisheries;160 
Oregon’s senators have introduced a bill to provide authority and 
funding to implement these agreements,161 at an expected federal cost 
of $500 million.162 On a third front, the Western Governors 
Association and the Native American Rights Fund submitted joint 
written testimony163 to a Senate appropriations subcommittee 
regarding federal funding for negotiating and implementing tribal 
water settlements; the testimony concluded by stating that failure to 
provide sufficient funding for this purpose “will only increase federal 
costs, perpetuate hardship to tribes, and prolong resolution of 
conflicts between reserved water rights and state-created water rights. 
This, in turn, could potentially disrupt established economies and 
hinder effective state and regional water planning and 
development.”164 These events show that the West still seeks federal 
action and federal money to help resolve its biggest (and most 
expensive) water problems. 
C. Future Water Supply Shortfalls 
Looking ahead, the American West will see water management 
challenges even greater and more fundamental than the big ones it 
faces today. Perhaps the most famous and most difficult of these 
challenges is the looming shortfall of water supplies in the Colorado 
River Basin.165 According to a 2012 study by Reclamation, the gap 
 
160 For a thorough and thoughtful analysis of Klamath River Basin water issues, see 
HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN (2008). 
161 Klamath Basin Water Recovery and Economic Restoration Act of 2014, S. 2379, 
113th Cong. (2014). 
162 At a hearing on the Senate bill, an aide to former Oregon governor John Kitzhaber 
stated that the negotiated agreements had helped bring stability to the basin, but that “this 
stability will not last unless Congress acts now to authorize federal participation in these 
agreements . . . . The basin has done its part to overcome conflict, now it is time for 
Congress to do the same and pass S. 2379.” California/Oregon/Klamath Basin, 2090 W. 
STATES WATER COUNCIL (May 23, 2014), available at http://www.westernstateswater.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/NEWS-2090.pdf (quoting Richard Whitman, Natural 
Resources Policy Director to Governor Kitzhaber, at a hearing of the Senate Energy and 
Natural Resources Committee, Water and Power Subcommittee, June 3, 2014). 
163 Senate Appropriations/Indian Water Rights, 2088 W. STATES WATER COUNCIL 
(May 23, 2014), available at http://www.westernstateswater.org/wp-content/uploads/2012 
/11/NEWS-2088.pdf. 
164 Id. 
165 The water woes of the Colorado River Basin brought a front-page story in The New 
York Times, indicating the national significance of the problem. See Michael Wines, 
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between water supply and demand in the basin will grow to an annual 
average of 3.2 million acre-feet (MAF) by 2060.166 That projection is 
daunting enough, but the actual shortfall is quite likely to be worse, 
given that the 3.2 MAF average probably underestimates the impact 
of climate change.167 And the Colorado River Basin is not alone in 
facing a major gap between water supply and demand. Another 
Reclamation study estimated that the Lower Rio Grande Basin would 
face an average annual water supply shortfall of around two-thirds of 
a million acre-feet by 2060.168 Nor are such challenges limited to the 
Southwest. For example, irrigation water shortages in northern 
Montana’s Milk River Basin, which already average 71,000 acre-feet 
annually, may worsen by approximately 50% by 2050 due to changes 
in runoff and increases in crop water demands.169 In addition, the 
Milk River Basin may see increasing stress on water supplies because 
of environmental, recreational, and tribal water demands.170 
What do these legislative efforts and predicted shortfalls portend 
for the future role of the federal government in western water 
matters? Most fundamentally, they suggest that—general principles or 
philosophies aside—there is still significant interest in federal 
assistance (namely, money) to help address stubborn water supply 
problems, especially ones involving expensive infrastructure or 
restoration projects. That interest is likely to grow over time, as 
climate change and population growth combine to make these 
problems more frequent and more severe. Thus, pressure may build 
over time for greater federal investment—and hence involvement—in 
water solutions. 
 
Colorado River Drought Forces a Painful Reckoning for States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2014, 
at A1. 
166 U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN 
WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (2012). 
167 This is true because the study analyzed four scenarios for future water supply in the 
basin, but only one of those four accounted for the impacts of climate change. Id. at 6–7 
(summarizing the four water supply scenarios, and noting that lower flows were expected 
under the scenario accounting for climate change). 
168 U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
LOWER RIO GRANDE BASIN STUDY ES-4 (2013). One of the study’s more disturbing 
projections is that climate change could decrease the reliable annual yield of the Falcon-
Amistad Reservoir system on the Rio Grande by about 40%. Id. at ES-12. 
169 U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ST. MARY RIVER AND MILK 
RIVER BASINS STUDY SUMMARY REPORT 10–12 (2012). 
170 Id. at 12–13. Further, construction of a new reservoir in the Canadian portion of this 
international river basin would allow increased irrigation in Canada and exacerbate 
shortages in Montana. Id. at 13. 
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If and when Congress gets serious about addressing twenty-first 
century water resource challenges, what might be the elements of a 
new generation of federal water policy? The specifics are difficult to 
predict, as they may depend on factors such as the location and 
severity of droughts, legal conflicts over water shortages, and 
congressional attitudes toward spending. But given Congress’ track 
record on water, recent demands for federal legislation and spending, 
and the growing water challenges facing the West, one can anticipate 
the general principles and broad outlines of a potential “third wave” 
of water policy at the federal level.171 
First, any new federal water policy will need to focus primarily on 
a small number of key problems that implicate important federal 
interests and that are unlikely to be resolved successfully without 
federal involvement and investment. Addressing water needs in 
Indian Country is one obvious priority, and tribal water settlements 
have become the preferred vehicle for doing so; ensuring that future 
settlements have the requisite funding may be crucial to the success of 
negotiations. Aquatic ecosystems (especially for purposes of fish 
habitat) are another federal priority, as expressed in the Clean Water 
Act, the ESA, and various basin-specific measures such as the San 
Joaquin provisions in the 2009 public lands bill.172 Environmental 
restoration has been a particular priority in basins where native fish 
populations have been hit hard by the construction and operation of 
federal water projects, as illustrated by the Central Valley Project 
Improvement Act173 and by bipartisan congressional support for 
endangered fish programs in the Upper Colorado and San Juan basins. 
This last point suggests a third area—review of federal water project 
operations—that could be an important focus of federal water policy 
in the twenty-first century. The WRRDA directed the Corps to 
develop plans for operational reviews of its projects;174 the SECURE 
Water Act suggested that Reclamation should consider revising 
project operations as a climate change adaptation strategy.175 
 
171 Readers interested in more specific policy proposals should consider the ideas 
offered by the professor and former Interior Solicitor John Leshy in a concise 2009 article. 
John Leshy, Notes on a Progressive National Water Policy, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 133 
(2009). 
172 For a summary of several of the basin-specific measures, see Benson, supra note 85, 
at 153–58. 
173 Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. XXXIV, 106 Stat. 4706, 4706–31 (1992). 
174 See supra note 142. 
175 Changes to reservoir operating guidelines were one of several potential strategies 
that Congress directed Reclamation to consider in addressing the potential water impacts 
BENSON (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  11:22 AM 
2015] The Greenback, the Humpback, and the Silverback: 715 
How a Third Wave of Federal Water Policy Could Benefit the West 
Congress could go further by requiring Reclamation to develop new, 
long-term project operating plans, as it did explicitly for Glen Canyon 
Dam in the Grand Canyon Protection Act.176 
Second, significant federal funding will be an essential component 
to provide financial assistance and incentives for addressing targeted 
problems. At a time when Congress is generally tight-fisted about 
discretionary spending, this element may seem like a difficult sell. 
But the near-unanimous enactment of the WRRDA, despite its eight-
figure price tag, shows that even deficit hawks can be persuaded to 
vote for serious water-related investments if the rationale and demand 
are sufficiently strong. Some of the most compelling cases will 
involve negotiated settlement agreements—like the current Klamath 
Basin package177 or tribal water settlements—that promise to resolve 
lengthy and costly litigation, eliminate uncertainty, and address 
problems in a way that key interests can accept . . . so long as the 
federal government bears much of the financial cost. The Reclamation 
Water Settlements Fund—created by Congress in 2009 in an effort to 
guarantee future funding for specified tribal water settlements by 
setting aside some money that would otherwise flow to the 
Reclamation Fund178—shows the importance of assuring funding for 
such measures and suggests one source of potential federal dollars. 
Third, the new federal water policy must continue to respect the 
strong interests of states in allocating and managing water resources, 
while ensuring that federal priorities are respected and protected. 
Striking this balance is delicate and requires more than the standard 
statutory “savings clause” purporting to preserve state authorities and 
state-law water rights,179 as such declarations do not necessarily carry 
a great deal of weight.180 While any federal water initiative is sure to 
draw opposition on principle, a new program could prove politically 
 
of climate change in the West. See Reed D. Benson, Federal Water Law and the “Double 
Whammy”: How the Bureau of Reclamation Can Help the West Adapt to Drought and 
Climate Change, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1049, 1058–61 (2012). 
176 Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. XVIII, 106 Stat. at 4669–73. 
177 See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text. 
178 Pub. L. No. 111-11, § 10501, 123 Stat. 991, 1375 (2009) (codified as amended at 43 
U.S.C. § 407 (2012)). 
179 Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. § 383, is a famous state-law 
savings clause, and the Clean Water Act contains two such clauses in sections 101(g) and 
510. See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text. 
180 See Benson, supra note 10, at 295 (noting that Supreme Court interpretations of 
such clauses have varied). 
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acceptable if it involves a clearly defined and legitimate federal 
interest, reserves meaningful roles for state laws and institutions, and 
provides enough money to convince pragmatists that the benefits 
would outweigh the baggage. 
Finally, new federal water policy for the West must directly 
address the serious problem of over-allocation facing many major 
river basins, especially in the southern half of the region.181 Over-
allocation is a problem that has become painfully evident in 
California,182 where the water needs of salmon, other endangered 
species, and wildlife refuges have conflicted with irrigation demands, 
especially as the ongoing drought has cut available supplies.183 It is 
increasingly clear on the Rio Grande, where 2014 saw new litigation 
filed by Texas against New Mexico under the 1938 Compact,184 as 
well as a new ESA lawsuit seeking greater flows, enough to sustain 
the last wild population of endangered silvery minnows.185 And it is 
inescapable in the Colorado River Basin, where current reservoir 
levels have reached historic lows,186 demands will likely be much 
 
181 The major basins in the northern half of the West—the Missouri and Columbia 
basins—have their own serious and intractable issues, many of which relate to operational 
priorities for federal water projects. Sandra Zellmer identified many of the big issues on 
the Missouri in a 2004 article. See generally Sandra B. Zellmer, A New Corps of Discovery 
for Missouri River Management, 83 NEB. L. REV. 305 (2004). That same year, a 
controversy over water withdrawals prompted the National Research Council to produce a 
report on Columbia River management that provided an overview of many of the issues 
posed by declining salmon populations in the basin. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
MANAGING THE COLUMBIA RIVER: INSTREAM FLOWS, WATER WITHDRAWALS, AND 
SALMON SURVIVAL (2004). 
182 A recent study of water rights and water supplies in California concluded that the 
state has already allocated about five times more water than its rivers actually carry in an 
average year. Theodore E. Grantham & Joshua H. Viers, 100 Years of California’s Water 
Rights System: Patterns, Trends and Uncertainty, 9 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1 (2014) 
(comparing the face value of existing appropriative water rights with mean annual runoff 
in California). The study also concluded that 16 of the state’s 27 major rivers had water 
allocations exceeding mean annual runoff; the most over-allocated was the heavily 
irrigated San Joaquin River Basin, with existing water rights 861% greater than average 
flow. Id. at 5. 
183 California’s water problems have produced several legislative proposals in the 
current Congress, including both the dueling Central Valley drought bills and a major 
package for the Klamath. See supra notes 156, 160–62 and accompanying text. 
184 Michael Haederle, Texas, New Mexico Tangle Over Water, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/25/nation/la-na-texas-water-20130126. 
185 Scott Streater, Rio Grande: Enviros Sue Obama Admin over Low Flows, Threats to 
Species, E&E DAILY (July 24, 2014), available at http://www.eenews.net/login?r=%2F 
special_reports%2Fdrought_2012%2Fstories%2F1060003448. 
186 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Interior Bureau of Reclamation, Lake Mead Levels 
Drop to Historic Lows (July 8, 2014), available at http://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/news 
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greater than average supplies by mid-century,187 and a recent study of 
groundwater overdraft suggests that pumping of aquifers in the basin 
already far exceeds sustainable levels.188 Moreover, a recent GAO 
study concludes that future water shortages will not be limited to a 
few famously overworked western river basins.189 Over-allocation is 
a big, important problem of national significance, solutions to which 
are likely to be expensive and politically difficult . . . in short, exactly 
the kind of problem that calls out for federal assistance. 
CONCLUSION 
The twentieth century saw two distinct waves of federal water 
policy—water project development and environmental protection—as 
Congress tackled massive challenges that exceeded the capabilities of 
the private sector and the states. Both waves brought a combination of 
federal money and federal requirements, while respecting the key role 
of states in water allocation and management. Congress should return 
to this formula in addressing the serious and widespread over-
allocation of water supplies in the western United States, a problem 
that climate change will only exacerbate. It is the West’s great water 
challenge of the twenty-first century, and Congress can help ensure an 
effective response by crafting a third wave of federal water policy. 
  
 
release/detail.cfm?RecordID=47409 (noting that the water level in Lake Mead had fallen 
lower than at any point since the reservoir began filling in the 1930s). 
187 See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text. 
188 See Press Release, Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., Satellite Study Reveals 
Parched U.S. West Using Up Underground Water (July 24, 2014), available at http://www 
.nasa.gov/press/2014/july/satellite-study-reveals-parched-us-west-using-up-underground   
-water/ (describing groundwater overdrafts in the Colorado River Basin over a ten-year 
period, with groundwater losses in that time exceeding the volume of Lake Mead). “The 
extent of groundwater loss may pose a greater threat to the water supply of the western 
United States than previously thought.” Id. 
189 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FRESHWATER: SUPPLY CONCERNS 
CONTINUE, AND UNCERTAINTIES COMPLICATE PLANNING 28 (2014) (“State water 
managers continue to expect widespread freshwater shortages in the future, according to 
our survey . . . . Specifically, 40 of 50 state water managers responding to our 2013 survey 
expected shortages in some portion of their states under average conditions in the next 10 
years.”). Of the seventeen western states from the Great Plains to the West Coast, only two 
expected no shortages under average conditions over the next decade, whereas twelve 
states expected “regional” shortages. See id. at 29. 
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